Liberal interventionism flows from pretty much the same mindset as that which produced the
Anti-Social Behaviour Order - I don't like what you do, and I'm going to use force to stop you.
Relying as it does on the both the threat of force and the use of force, on limbs getting rent and skulls getting cracked, liberal interventionism is anything but liberal, of course - and it's sad to see
David Aaronovitch, one of our more intelligent new
Palmerstons, display his ignorance of some basic history when making the case for a humanitarian intervention in Burma
in today's 'Times'.
By positioning the adjective 'needy' immediately beside the noun 'Burmese', Aaronovitch, to his credit, passes
The Cohen Test with flying colours. Yet he writes of state control,
"...after the Second World War there grew up a kind of admiration of the mobilisatory capacities of totalitarian governments. Stalin had saved Soviet heavy industry from the Germans by moving it physically from Belorussia to the Urals. The command economy had proved its worth by building gazillions of T34 tanks. By the late 1950s and 60s this was translated into praise for the Sputniks and Gagarins of the Soviet space effort and in the 70s into warm words about Cuba's health system.
It was a hallucination. The democracies had done as good a job in war production as the dictatorships, and were to prove massively superior at technological innovation. By the late 1970s it was becoming clear that the only thing real communism - or any totalitarianism, including theocracy - was good at, was repression".
While his ultimate point is true, he seems not to know that the reason the democracies were as good at war production as the totalitarians was that they were just as ruthless at grabbing the means of production; indeed, in the comparative cases of the UK and Germany, even more so - the UK was pretty much geared up to a full war economy by 1939, while Germany did not fully mobilise the home front until 1941 at the very earliest.
Aaronivitch concludes his piece soberly, and soberingly, by writing,
"How often do we need it proved? The issue isn't whether we have the right to intervene - because the consequences of vicious dictatorships usually catch up with us in time - but whether or not, practically, we can. "
All very high minded and moral, for sure, but just a little too vague, aggressive, insolent, and Palmerstonian for my taste.